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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of an indemnity agreement. The failure to consider this principle may result
in an injustice to the insured. This point may be illustrated by contrasting the
O'Dowd and Union Paving cases. The basis of the injured party's cause of
action in the former case was that the Housing Authority was passively negligent
and the insured was actively negligent. The theory of the cross-claim was that
the insured was ultimately liable on its indemnity agreement because it had been
solely negligent. Thus an implied in law obligation to indemnify was easily
recognized as the real basis of the insured's liability. In the latter case, however,
the Paving Company's complaint merely alleged the sweeping indemnity agree-
ment as the basis of the insured's liability. The important difference in the
two cases is that in the latter the court failed to recognize the possibility of a
liability of the insured which (though in form the result of his indemnity agree-
ment) was in substance a liability he would have incurred in the absence of
such an agreement. If a reasonable construction is to be given a contractual
liability exclusion clause, and the intention of the parties to a contract of liability
insurance embodying such a clause is to be respected, the courts must be quick
to recognize that the literal application of the clause is to be held in abeyance
until the deeper consideration of the extent of the insured's liability in the ab-
sence of an express indemnity agreement is determined. 27
THE COHEN CASE AND THE ONE YEAR PROVISION
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
INTRODUCTION
The Statute of Frauds, as adopted in New York, provides in part that an
agreement which "by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof. . ... 1 is unenforceable unless in writing. The case law inter-
preting this section is complex and technical. A seemingly new and equally
complex rule was introduced in Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co.2 At times the prec-
edence of this decision has been obscured by memoranda opinions which, with-
out explanation, cite it as controlling; at other times the decision has been
misapplied. The rule has finally reached the confused point where, in the recent
case of Duncan v. Clarke,3 both plaintiff and defendant cited the Cohen case
as controlling on the question of the application of this one year provision.4 In
an attempt to determine the exact nature of this rule it is necessary to consider
the Cohen decision within the framework of its antecedents, and in the light of
those cases which have followed it, making the rule more explicit by application
or distinction.
27. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Virginia Engineering Co., 213 F.2d 109, 112
(4th Cir. 1954).
1. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31(1).
2. 264 App. Div. 260, 35 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Ist Dep't 1942), alf'd, 289 N.Y. 846, 47 N.E.2d
443 (1943).
3. 308 N.Y. 282, 125 N.E.2d 569 (1955).
4. Id. at 283.
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THE COHEN RuL,
In the formation of the rule of Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., the Appellate
Division relied on the leading case of Blake v. Voigtzi in which the Court of
Appeals was concerned with the application of this section of the Statute of
Frauds to an agreement which provided that for a period of one year defendants
would pay a certain commission on all business procured by plaintiff. The
contract further provided that either party had the right to terminate the con-
tract within a year. In an action to recover the commissions owing under the
contract, the defendants contended that the Statute of Frauds barred the
plaintiff's claim. Specifically, the defendants argued that termination by exercise
of the option would not be performance, but rather destruction of the contract.
The court agreed that this proposition would apply where there was no provi-
sion in the contract authorizing either party to terminate. But the court con-
sidered the question of ". . whether a contract, which . . . is not to be per-
formed within a year is taken out of the statute by the fact that it was part of
such contract that either party might rightfully terminate it within the year." O
The court held that the Statute of Frauds was inapplicable because performance
of the contract was possible within a year. The exercise of the express termina-
tion provision, an event which could happen within a year's time, would be
rightful performance and not destruction of the contract, ". .. because the
contract would be executed in a way that the parties agreed that it might be
executed." 7
The court, in deciding the Cohen case, was squarely presented with the appli-
cation of the Statute of Frauds to an agreement which contained no express
termination provision. In this case plaintiff-salesman brought an action on an
oral agreement, by which the defendant-corporation had promised to pay the
plaintiff commissions on all orders placed by the Resolute Paper Products Cor-
poration, a customer procured by the plaintiff, " I... . at any time, whether or
not plaintiff was in defendant's employ at the time of the placing of such
orders.' "s The defendant appealed from an order which had stricken from its
answer, as insufficient in law, the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the order 0
5. 134 N.Y. 69, 31 N.E. 256 (1892).
6. Id. at 72, 31 N.E. at 256.
7. Id. at 72-73, 31 N.E. at 257.
8. 264 App. Div. at 260, 35 N.YS.2d at 207.
9. Frequently, courts presented with this question on interlocutory appeal are reluctant to
make a final decision with the few facts presented by the pleadings: see Schulman v. Royal
Industrial Bank, 281 App. Div. 674, 117 N.YS.2d 459 (Ist Dep't 1952); Baker v. Gcnezee
Brewing Co., 271 App. Div. 994, 6S N.Y.S.2d 457 (1st Dep't 1947); Jacobson v. Jacobson,
268 App. Div. 770, 49 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Ist Dep't 1944); Gordon v. Katz, 82 N.YS2d IG9 (Sup.
CL 194S). It has been argued that the Cohen case be included in this clasz: see diseating
opinions per Clark, J. in Droste v. Harry Atlas Sons, Inc., 145 F.2d 899, 900 (2d Cir. 1944),
petition for rehearing denied, 147 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1945); Newhirk v. C. C. Bradley
& Son, Inc., 271 App. Div. 658, 661, 67 N.Y.S.2d 459, 462-63 (4th Dep't 1947). But it is
apparent from the Cohen decision itself and from the subsequent weight it has been accorded
that the opinion was rendered on the merits.
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The court, citing authority to indicate the conflict of opinion existing in other
jurisdictions,'0 admitted that the question had not been directly considered by
the appellate courts of its own state. But the Court of Appeals in Blake v. Voigt
provided an excellent guide for the result reached by the Appellate Division in
the Cohen case. In the Blake case the Court of Appeals had held that an express
termination provision removed the contract from the Statute of Frauds and, in
anticipation of the particular problem of the Cohen case, had said further that
failure to express such a provision would call for the application of the statute.
The court in the Cohen case adopted the reasoning of the Blake case and the
guidance of its dictum. The plaintiff suggested that the possibility of the de-
fendant or customer retiring from business within a year would render perform-
ance within a year possible. But the court rejected this contention, reasoning, as
had the court in the Blake case, that the termination of the contract by the
occurrence of this contingency would not be "performance" of the contract, in-
asmuch as such an event was not expressly mentioned. Therefore, what had been
dictum in the Blake case became the holding of the Cohen decision.
Moreover, the Cohen opinion did not overlook the possibility that the
Statute of Frauds would not be applicable if performance, however unlikely,
might be accomplished within a year even without the aid of a termination
provision. -It distinguished the authorities which had so held," saying ". . . the
contract here is of a different character, for not only is it of indefinite duration
but, by its terms, an obligation is imposed on the defendant which continues so
long as the defendant and Resolute Paper Products Corp. exist. It is true that
if Resolute Paper Products Corp. should place no orders with the defendant
within the year, no commissions would be earned, but the defendant's contract
would not thereby have been 'performed,' for it would then apply to any orders
that might be accepted in succeeding years."' 2 This Appellate Division ruling
was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals.'
Several years later, the Court of Appeals explicitly reemphasized the holding
of the Cohen decision in Martocci v. Greater New York Brewery, Inc.14 Again
the court was presented with the question of whether a verbal contract to pay
plaintiff commissions on any sales made to a certain customer introduced to
defendant by plaintiff was within the statute. Following the Cohen case, the
court decided that if the terms of the contract had included an event which
might end the contractual relationship of the parties within a year, defendant's
possible liability beyond that time would not bring the contract within the
statute. But since the relationship will continue beyond a year, the contract
was held to be within the statute, even though the continuing liability to which
defendant was subject was merely a contingent one.
10. Edmund D. Hewins, Inc. v. Malboro Cotton Mills, 242 Mass. 282, 136 N.E. 159
(1922) ; Fish Clearing House, Inc. v. Melchor, Armstrong, Dessau Co., 174 Wash. 539, 25 P.2d
381 (1933).
11. Warren Chemical & Mfg. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N.Y. 586, 23 N.E. 903 (1890); Kent
v. Kent, 62 N.Y. 560 (1875) ; Trustees v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 19 N.Y. 30S (1859).
12. 264 App. Div. at 261, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
13. Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., 289 N.Y. 846, 47 N.E.2d 443 (1943).
14. 301 N.Y. 57, 92 N.E.2d 887 (1950).
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THm REQUISITES FOR ITS APPLICATION
Before analysis of the specific elements of the Cohen case as they have been
applied in later decisions, a prerequisite to the discussion of the Statute of
Frauds proper must be considered. It is an elementary principle that in order
for the Statute of Frauds to apply there must be a contract, in all other respects
recognized as giving rise to a legal obligation. As obvious as this proposition
may appear, it is the basis for distinguishing several decisions which have held
that agreements bearing close resemblance to the contracts of the Cohen and
Martocci cases are not subject to their proscriptions.13
This proposition was demonstrated in Nat Nal Service Stations, Inc. v.
Wolf,:6 where the complaint alleged an oral agreement whereby the defendant
was to grant plaintiff a discount on all gasoline which plaintiff purchased from an
oil producer through the defendant. The Appellate Division held that the agree-
ment created a contractual obligation which, because of its indefinite duration,
was within the Statute of Frauds. The Court of Appeals, by a narrowly divided
court, reversed this decision and stated that it was ". . . confronted with an
alleged contract by the terms of which neither party was bound to do anything
at any time, and consequently there is nothing in its terms to bring it within
the Statute of Frauds."' 7 The plaintiff of the Cohen case surrendered considera-
tion by procuring a customer for defendant, and similarly, the plaintiff of the
Martocci case by introducing a prospective customer to defendant. "In both
those cases the performance by the respective plaintiffs under the alleged oral
agreement constituted the consideration necessary to impose a binding obliga-
tion upon the defendant. .. ."s In the Nat Na! case the plaintiff did nothing
to give rise to defendant's obligation.
Where plaintiff's performance has given rise to defendant's obligation, the
specific elements of the principle of the Cohen case come into focus. The en-
durance of the defendant's liability must first be measured to ascertain that it
exceeds the statutory period of one year. Then it must be found that the agree-
ment expresses no termination provision by which the excessive period may
be shortened.
THE ENDURANCE OF THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
Where the obligation imposed upon the defendant by the contract endures
beyond a year, the contract must be in writing to be enforceable. In Fisfelder
v. Cournand,'9 plaintiff brought an action on an oral agreement whereby de-
fendant promised to pay plaintiff commissions for his work as a sales manager.
The contract provided that it was terminable by either party on thirty days
15. Prussiano v. Sunrise Plastering Corp, 235 App. Div. 1182, 141 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d
Dep't 1955); Bakers Equipment Corp. v. Barbarino, 128 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1954).
16. 304 N.Y. 332, 107 N.E2d 473 (1952), reversing 279 App. Div. 2C6, 103 N.Y.S2d 316
(1st Dep't 1951).
17. Id. at 337, 107 N.E.2d at 475.
18. Id. at 339, 107 N.E2d at 477.
19. 270 App. Div. 162, 59 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1st Dep't 1945).
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notice, but that in event of such termination defendant would remain obligated,
without limitation of time, to continue to pay plaintiff's commissions on any
reorders subsequently received. The court held that this contract was within
the Statute of Frauds, deciding that the obligation to pay commissions on
reorders subsequently received from customers "... 'would continue in
perpetuity.' "20
It is this limitless quality of the defendant's obligation which places the
contract within the statute under the Cohen rule,2  and the fact that under
the contract, defendant's liability is dependent upon acceptance of future orders
is not a saving factor. Although defendant's liability might be contingent upon
acceptance of a future order, the contractual obligation would endure for an
indefinite period irrespective of the action taken on any such order.
It is essential in considering this point to distinguish, as the decision in the
Cohen case did, between perpetual obligation and an obligation which, although
the time for performance may be indefinite, admits of accomplishment within a
year.22 If the performance of the contract is such that it may be accomplished
within a year, then Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co. is inapplicable. 23 An obvious
example of this distinction is the case of Shewitt v. City Stores Co., 1 where
plaintiff sought to recover commissions under an oral agreement. This contract
provided that plaintiff was to receive a commission on a sale of stock to de-
fendant if plaintiff could bring about that sale. The court held that the agree-
ment was not within the statute, since the sale and the payment of commissions
were acts which could be accomplished within the year. The court distinguished
the precedent of the Cohen case because the agreement of that case ". . . was
of indefinite duration and by its terms did not admit of performance within one
year."25
There are, however, several decisions in which the distinction is tenuous. In
Newkirk v. C. C. Bradley & Son, Inc.26 plaintiff sought to recover commissions
20. Id. at 164, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
21. Droste v. Harry Atlas Sons, Inc., 145 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Fine v. Pacemaker, 277
App. Div. 881, 98 N.Y.S.2d 230 (2d Dep't 1950); Archer v. Hamilton Wright Organization,
Inc., -Misc-, 155 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Hooke v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co.,
65 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. Ct. 1946). But see the memorandum decision of Scanlan v. Henie, 264
App. Div. 913, 35 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1st Dep't 1942), in which the majority wrote no opinion but
the dissent set forth plaintiff's testimony indicating defendant's limitless obligation. The rule
has been properly extended to contracts under which defendant's obligation, although not of
indefinite duration, is to continue for a definite period, expressly in excess of a year's time:
Mosberg v. Judson Enterprises, Inc., 139 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Jaffe v. New York
Towers, Inc., 108 N.Y.S.2d 193 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951). (Commissions on rents under leases for
terms of 21 and 5 years respectively.)
22. See note 11 supra.
23. Nathanson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 189 Misc. 1024, 68 N.Y.S.2d 914
(Sup. Ct. 1947); Blakeley v. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
24. 74 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
25. Id. at 739.
26. 271 App. Div. 658, 67 N.Y.S.2d 459 (4th Dep't 1947).
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under an oral contract. The defendant had promised that if plaintiff obtained
for it the exclusive right to manufacture a milling machine from a third party,
the defendant would then give plaintiff the exclusive sales agency for all such
machines thereafter produced, paying him a commission on all machines sold.
The court decided that such an agreement was not within the statute although
it came "perilously close"27 to the contract of the Cohen case. Although the
basis for this distinction is not specifically set forth in the opinion, the court
must have considered that the granting of the sales agency was the primary
performance of the contract, and that this was ".... the performance of a
single act which may or may not be executed within a year. . ...29
If, therefore, the contractual obligation can be performed within a year's
time, the Statute of Frauds will not apply. But where the contract sued on
does possess this quality of perpetual obligation, then it must be in writing to
be enforceable.
THE SAVING FACTOR OF AN ExPREss TEUNATiON PRovisioN
Even where the period for performance of the contract extends beyond a year,
the contract may still be saved from the requirements of the Statute of Frauds
if it contains an express termination provision. Failure to mention such a pro-
vision will generally render an oral contract unenforceable. Subsequent cases
have repeatedly applied this specific element of the rule which the Cohcn case
derived from the Blake case. In Sack v. BeasleyiP the plaintiff argued that a
custom of the trade which provided for the payment of commissions for as long
as a radio show remained on the air for a particular sponsor removed his oral
contract with the defendant from the proscription of the Statute of Frauds. But
the court decided that since the oral employment contract did not express an
event which might cause performance to be completed within a year, plaintiff
could not claim the saving factor of an implied termination provision. The
failure to express a contingency or option by which performance of the verbal
contract may be effected within a year is fundamental to the application of the
Cohen rule. 0
It would seem that since failure to express a termination provision calls for
the application of the statute, the corollary of this proposition should operate
to remove all contracts which express such provisions from the statute. Gen-
erally, an express termination provision is sufficient. In Steiner v. Fcnstcr,31
for example, the defendant was under an obligation to pay the plaintiff com-
missions for the duration of the Second World War. The court decided that
".. . the end of the war was a possible event which might have transpired
before the end of the year. The contract could, therefore, have been performed
27. Id. at 661, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
28. Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., 264 App. Div. at 261, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
29. 282 App. Div. 153, 122 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1st Dep't 1953).
30. Goddard v. Gladstone, 146 N.YS.2d S90 (Sup. CL 1955); Beaver Pulp & Paper Co.
v. St. Raymond Sales, Ltd., 139 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. CL 1955); National Broadcasting Co.
v. Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc., 29 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
31. 51 N.Y.S.2d S14 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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within the year. . . ."2 In Jones v. Demuth Glass Works, Inc.,3 3 a memo-
randum opinion, the court set forth facts which called for the application of the
Cohen rule, but said that the contract was "dissimilar" to the one considered in
the Cohen case. The basis for this dissimilarity is not apparent in the report,
but the complaint reveals that ". . . such agreement... [was] . . . to
continue as long as both parties remained in business."' 4
In O'Brien v. O'Neil,35 the plaintiff was to receive commissions for procuring
customers for defendant's service of guarding war plants. These commissions
were to be paid for as long as business relations lasted between defendant and
the customers. In spite of this provision the court held that the contract was
unenforceable, mistakenly concentrating on the fact that there was nothing
mentioned in the contract that it was to last only for the duration of the war.
The court overlooked the fact that the contract provided for payment of com-
missions for as long as business relations lasted between the defendant and the
customers. Such an express termination provision renders performance of the
contract possible within the deadline of the Statute of Frauds.30
Included within the general rule that expression of a termination provision
removes a contract from the Statute of Frauds are those provisions which are
in their nature options. In the Blake case a mutual option to terminate was
held sufficient to render performance within a year a possibility. Subsequent
cases have extended this holding to include unilateral options, whether in
defendant's control,3 7 or in plaintiff's control 38 There is, however, some conflict
of opinion as to the effect of the plaintiff having the option. In Houston v.
American Surety Co.,3 9 the defendant was obligated to pay the plaintiff's salary
for as long as the plaintiff decided to remain in defendant's employ. The court
held that the contract was not saved from the statute by such a provision, since
the defendant's performance was to be continuous. It is submitted, however,
that it is immaterial in whose control the power of exercising the option to
terminate lies. When such a provision is placed in the contract, rightful termina-
tion within a year is possible and the Statute of Frauds should not apply.
It is where the contract expresses a contingency, rather than an option, that
the general rule does not unqualifiedly apply. The courts have been more strict
in allowing the expression of a contingency to remove an oral agreement from
32. Id. at 815.
33. 271 App. Div. 840, 66 N.Y.S.2d 12 (2d Dep't 1946).
34. Id., Transcript of Record, p. 9.
35. 271 App. Div. 647, 67 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1st Dep't 1947).
36. Zupan v. Blumberg, 1 A.D.2d 203, 148 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1st Dep't 1956) (commissions
to be paid as long as account was active in the concern) ; Platt v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc.,
-Misc.-, 150 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (contract to terminate in event defendant ceases
serving such customer for any reason whatsoever); High v. Pritzker, 58 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup.
Ct. 1945) (contract to pay commissions for as long as defendant continued to exist).
37. Standard Bitulithic Co. v. Curran, 256 Fed. 68 (2d Cir. 1919) ; Deucht v. Storper, 44
N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943).
38. Price v. Reynolds Metals Co., 69 F. Supp. 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Raymond Spector
Co. v. Serutan Co., 60 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
39. 57 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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the Statute of Frauds. While a simple and relatively normal event is sufficient/e
the courts have been reluctant to accord this privilege to a contract in which
there is one definite performance bargained for and the contingency, rather than
expressing an alternative method of performance, is an event which completely
frustrates further performance. In Radio Corp. of America v. Cable Radio Tube
Corp.1- for example, the plaintiff had the right to terminate a four year license
agreement only in event of the defendant's default, insolvency or bankruptcy.
The court, denying that such a provision placed the contract without the statute,
-aid that "as well might the possibility of a breach so fundamental that the
plaintiffs might rescind take an oral contract out of the statute, as an option to
terminate that is exercisable only in the event of a breach or of insolvency.'4'
Again in the case of Sclnwerin Air Conditioning Corp. v. Serrel, Inc.f3 where
defendant had the right to terminate in the event of the plaintiff's bankruptcy
or fraud, the court dismissed the complaint, saying that "the contingency pro-
vided in the contract here defeats the contract and does not merely advance the
period of fulfillment."-44 Thus, where the contingency expressed in the contract
is an event which defeats the anticipated performance, such as breach, fraud
or bankruptcy, the oral contract will nevertheless be subject to the requirements
of the Statute of Frauds.
With the elements of the Cohen case synthesized, the rule may be stated: a
contract, whose performance is impossible within a year, and which contains no
express provision for termination, may not be enforced unless in the written
form demanded by the Statute of Frauds.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that the Cohen case unnaturally broadened the applica-
tion of this one year provision. But the decision did no more than make
explicit that which had been implicit. The distinction between an ex%;press or
implied termination provision may appear tenuous, but the statute itself makes
this distinction when it states that a contract "by its terms . . .not to be
performed within one year. . .. ,46 must be in writing in order to be enforce-
able. Not only was the decision in conformity with the plain meaning of the
statute in this respect, but it was also in accord with the authorities which pre-
ceded it. This very distinction had been intimated by the courts when relieving
oral contracts of the burden of the Statute of Frauds in such cases as Blake v.
Vagt.4 7 Further, the court's contention that performance was impossible within
a year was also the necessary result of the climate of opinion on this question.
40. See note 37 supra.
41. 65 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1933).
42. Id. at 785.
43. 132 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
44. Id. at 373. See also One Television, Inc. v. One Fifth Avenue Operating Corp, 205
M sc. 1090, 139 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
45. Meehan, Contracts Not to Be Performed Within One Year-Is New York Extending
The Statute?, 20 Brooklyn L. Rev. 66 (1954).
46. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, § 31 (1). (Emphasis added.)
47. See note 5 supra.
1956-57] COMMENTS
728 FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
Only a distortion or disregard of already settled principles would have allowed
the court to hold that this perpetual obligation was capable of performance
within a year. The court which decided the Cohen case had no choice. Any
other solution would have been inconsistent with the framework of opinion which
had indicated the answer to the problem. While the Statute of Frauds itself
may be subject to criticism as an obsolete element of modern jurisprudence,48 a
court which renders a decision consistent with precedent and which refuses to
usurp the functions of the legislature, should not be the subject of criticism. 40
48. Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L.J. 427 (1928).
49. At present the New York State Legislature is considering a recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission for the clarification of section 31: N.Y. S. Int. No. 238 (1957); N.Y.
A. Int. No. 357 (1957). See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A) (1957).
